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Executive Summary
The role of research in policy processes has increased significantly in recent decades in almost every
country and in international organizations. In a milieu of increasing complexity, especially in the
socio-economic and political contexts, knowledge becomes a vital factor affecting the ability of policy
actors to influence the political agenda and the shape of policy outcomes. The degree of researchers`
and research institutes` participation is posited here as a significant factor that contributes to the
openness of the policy process and efficacy of policy itself. The objective of this study is to
investigate the role of research in policy decision-making processes in Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan as a part of one of the most remote areas of the Soviet Union, has suffered from a severe
scarcity of research-related resources during the years of transition. Despite the lack of local
experience with a market economy or democracy building, the Kazakhstani government pledged to
conduct reforms based on three pillars: creation of a market economy, democratization of the political
process and institutions, and integration into the global economy. In the absence of indigenous
knowledge the concepts and methods used in the reforms came from external sources. During the
transition period (since 1991) the World Bank, USAID, EU, and ADB supported Kazakhstani reforms
with a high volume of knowledge and expertise. 
Today it appears that international and foreign organizations have to change their role as a source of
policy ideas, and the question of local ownership of reforms has emerged as a very real issue, as it
does in most other transition and developing countries. Using the case of pension reform this paper
address the questions speaking to the extent to which transitions are sustainable and supported by
indigenous policy-making expertise sufficient to provide the administrative capacity to support
vdemocratic governance. Also, this research intends to shed more light on how, why and what kinds of
expertise policy actors have been using in policy-making during the years of reform. Finally, it this
study investigates how research affected, if at all, the policy dialogue and public debates.
1I. Introduction 
The role of research in policy processes has increased significantly in recent decades in almost
every country and in international organizations. In the United States and countries of Western
Europe, research organizations play a vital role in the policy dialogue, providing all parties
(partisan and interest groups, governmental agencies and parliament) with ideas and policy
relevant analysis. A vast array of so-called think tanksi - from the very famous and influential
such as the Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, American Enterprise Institute, the
Heritage Foundation (USA), Royal Institute for International Affairs (UK), Center for
Development Research (Denmark), Kiel Institute for World Economies (Germany), to small
NGOs working in particular areas of expertise – manifest the growing role of knowledge in
policy-making process in modern western democracies.
Since the 1970s, the number and diversity of research policy centers (institutes) in developing
and transition countries has also grown. Latin America, Africa and Asia have been witnessing
the brisk growth of new types of institutions that have introduced important knowledge and
know-how, assisting their governments in market and social reforms. In Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, non-governmental research organizations close to the model of western
think tanks appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s after the collapse of the socialist system.
Many of the institutes established by western-oriented intellectuals and technocrats have played
prominent roles in the transition to the market economies in these countries. 
In FSU countries, the situation varies from country to country and from region to region. The
extent of research activities within post-Soviet space appears to depend heavily on the prior
allocation of intellectual and knowledge resources. The vast majority of academic resources of
the Soviet Union were rooted and concentrated in the Center – in the main cities of Russian
Federationii and in the most developed European territories of the former Soviet Union – Ukraine
and Belarus. The concentration of knowledge and power in this region provided the basis for a
comparatively successful transformation of many governmental research organizations into
private ones or the establishment of new research institutes by prominent experts and
intellectuals in particular areas. 
At the same time the other newly independent states faced a lack of local research capacity and
knowledge resources. The Central Asian region (CAR), one of the most remote areas of the
Soviet Union, has suffered from a severe scarcity of research-related resources during the years
of transition. Large numbers of scholars left the region to Western countries or Russia due to a
range of economic and political reasons. Education and the system of knowledge production
have undergone a painful transformation and retrenchment. The resources from state budgets
2available for research shrank dramatically, while the market (or non-state actors) failed to
provide any significant demand for or supply of research. 
Following this pattern, the governments of the CAR pursuing economic and political reforms
faced a range of challenges. Despite the lack of local experience with a market economy or
democracy building, almost all of them pledged to conduct reforms based on three pillars:
creation of a market economy, democratization of the political process and institutions, and
integration into the global economy. Where did the concepts and methods used in the reforms
come from in the absence of indigenous knowledge? The answer is similar throughout the entire
developing world: international expertise, provided by multilateral and foreign agencies such as
the Word Bank, IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the US Agency for International
Development, various agencies of the European Union, etc.
During the transition years, Kazakhstan has come to be known as a model student in following
the recommendations of external experts regarding market reforms. Not surprisingly, these
experts note that the Kazakhstani government has demonstrated relatively good abilities in
transition management as evidenced by having achieved macroeconomic stability, establishing
one of the best financial systems in the CIS, and creating a favorable climate to attract foreign
investments.iii It is the first post-Soviet country to launch an ambitious and radical pension
reform program.
The evidence shows that the Kazakhstani government has advanced its policy agenda primarily
in those spheres where it acquired significant foreign or international technical assistance, as in
the case of pension reform. The essential support provided by multilateral agencies was
expertise. The World Bank, USAID, EU, and ADB supported reforms with a high volume of
knowledge and expertise. Today it appears that international and foreign organizations have to
change their role as a source of policy ideas, and the question of local ownership of reforms has
emerged as a very real issue, as it does in most other transition and developing countries.
Leaving aside the issue of the relevance or success of the reforms for the moment, at the present
stage it might be useful to ask: Who will continue to push the reform agenda ahead? With the
ramping-down or phasing-out of international technical assistance and expertise, who will
produce the knowledge and ideas for policy-making in this country in the future?  These are the
critical questions that speak to the extent to which transitions are sustainable and supported by
indigenous policy-making expertise sufficient to provide the administrative capacity to support
democratic governance.
3II. Pension reform in Kazakhstan: Role of Expertise in the Policy Process
2.1 Background of the reform
The term “pension reform” denotes an entire range of political, economical, and societal issues
concerning income distribution, generational equality, social policy-making, financial market
regulations, poverty alleviation and so forth. This mixture of various concerns arising within the
processes involved in generating and adopting pension reform engages a wide variety of political
actors and conflicting interests. 
In Kazakhstan, the failure of the Soviet PAYG system led to mass protests by pensioners calling
for extensive political and economical measures. From 1995 to1997, like many other post-
Communist countries, Kazakhstan experienced a severe pension arrears crisis (about 5 months of
pension payments in 1996). As in other parts of the former Eastern Bloc, fewer workers were
paying pension contributions to support growing numbers of retirees. In Kazakhstan, the system
dependency ratio was about 0.56, i.e., only 1.8 contributors paid for one pensioner. By
comparison, in France, the ratio is five workers to one pensioner. 
In response to this pressure, the Kazakhstani government agreed to urgent and radical pension
reform, accompanied by an effort to pay off all existing pension arrears. The Pension Law,
passed by Parliament in July 1997, entered into effect on 1 January 1998, providing the basis for
the replacement of the PAYG system with a new pension system based on individual investment
accounts to be maintained either with the newly established State Accumulation Fund (SAF) or
with nonstate (privately owned) pension funds (NSAF).  The Soviet PAYG system existing at
the time had being designed for in the conditions of a planned economy characterized by full
employment, insignificant informal economic activity, a flat wage distribution, and so on.
Dramatic changes in the political and economic situation necessitated the reformation of the
pension system as well. 
At present, two systems are valid in Kazakhstan. An old state-supported PAYG pension system
will remain in force for pensioners who contributed to the system until 1998, but newcomers
cannot enter it. Workers who had accrued benefits under the old system retained their
entitlements. Their pensions will be paid in part from the old system and in part from the new
system, until the old system has been fully phased out. The new pension system will completely
replace the old one by 2045-2050. 
The basic scheme of the new Kazakhstani pension system is based on the concept introduced by
the World Bank in its volume, Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994), which recommends a
4combination of pay-as-you-go and funded pension systems. According to WB, a multi-pillar
system should include following elements: 
? Pillar 1 - a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension system designed to provide an income
floor for all elderly persons; 
? Pillar 2 - a mandatory funded and privately managed pension system--one whose current
reserves are equal to or greater than the present value of all future pension payment
liabilities, based on personal accounts (the Latin American approach) or occupational plans
(the OECD approach); 
? Pillar 3 - a voluntary system (also funded and privately managed), with strong government
regulation, to provide for additional savings and insurance. 
In the new Kazakhstani pension scheme, the Pillar 1 (a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension
system) has been eliminated, although other post-Communist countries that reformed their
pension systems at the same time preferred more cautious approaches (Andrews, 2001). For
instance, in Hungary, Poland, and Latvia the state continues to sustain the publicly funded
system simultaneously with privately funded components. The newly adopted Kazakhstani
pension system – fully funded, defined contribution accounts, relies on the second Pillar.
Kazakhstan adopted a system that relies completely on the FF/DC component. 
The institutional structure of the system consists of three major components: pension funds,
pension asset management companies, and custodian banks. By January 1, 2003, 15 private
funds (NSAFs) and one state accumulation fund (SAF) were operating in Kazakhstan. Thirteen
of the NSAFs are open and two are corporate ones. NASFs attract contributors and engage
pension assets management companies and custodians. The market is represented by 9 pension
asset management companies (AMCs), which decide where assets should be invested. They also
carry out regular re-evaluation of assets. Each fund keeps the accumulated assets in one
authorized bank custodian that accounts for and reports on all investment transactions, portfolio
allocation and investments return. Custodian banks accept deposits and make pension payments.
The basic three-tier structure was instituted to provide for a clear separation of accounts and
responsibilities so that a system of checks and balances would thwart any fraud and abuse). A
corresponding department of the National Bank controls every component of the «triangle».iv
Also, in order to calculate and pay PAYG pensions, maintain contribution records, and route
funds to the accounts of SAF and private pension funds, the State Pension Payment Center
(SPPC) was established in 1997. 
2.2  Role of expertise in the reform deliberation and public debates  
52.2.1 Policy actors and the role of their expert capacity in the reform deliberation
Governmental Working Group 
Officially the design of the pension reform program began in November 1996 when President
Nursultan Nazarbaev formed a governmental working group (WG) formally consisting of the
Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the
National Bank, the Minister of Labor and Social Protection, the head of the National Securities
Commission, two representatives of the private sector, and two members of parliament. The
governmental working group was a major designer and executor of the reform and also served as
a main veto actor. It was the only proficient local proposal actor that enjoyed significant
technical support from the World Bank, ADB, and USAID “providing both policy ideas and
direct technical assistance” (Orenstein, 2000, 24). 
While the composition of the working group represented both financial and social security
sectors, the discourse was led by the financial sub-group – the National Bank of RK, Ministry of
Finance, and technocrats hired by WB and USAID. The Ministry of Finance was a key partner
for the aid agencies, yet the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP) was relegated to the
position of “a background participant”. Even in 2000, two years after the launching of the reform
MLSP suffered from the shortage of research and analytical capacity. According to the
interviews with executives from MSLP the situation remains unchanged. 
Parliament 
Formally Parliament is one of the most important institutional veto actors. Despite this, however,
it did not play a significant role in the development of the reform program’s conceptual design
and evolution. As the evidence shows, Parliament had neither proposal nor veto power and did
not participate effectively in the development of pension reform.  At that point, Parliament
lacked the requisite technical and expert capacity to analyze the issue and suggest alternatives.
All the Parliamentarians practically could and did do was to provide “an important deliberative
forum” (Orenstein, 2000, 27). 
The political cost of any delay in the reform was extremely high during that period. The pensions
arrears crisis topped the domestic political agenda. Coverage of pension arrears was one of the
crucial political conditions of the reform. For this purpose the government received a USD 200
million loan from the WBv, and pushed hard to convince Parliament members to vote for the
governmental concept of the reform. No fundamentally different concepts were proposed by
Parliament to compete with the government`s proposal. 
6Civil Society Groups 
Although the Government submitted the reform program for debate, the nascent Kazakhstani
civil society was not capable of participating in the process in a meaningful way. Orenstein
argues that there were no real partisan or civil society vetoes or proposal actors, and the interests
groups that might have been drawn into the process in this particular case included the
Pensioners Movement and the trade unions . However, the Pensioners Movement represents only
the interests of current pensioners, and logically they held little interest in participating in the
design of a new pension scheme from which they hardly stood to benefit. The main issues that
topped their agenda were pension arrears, current benefit adequacy, and raising of retirement
age. The trade unions` representation capacity had narrowed dramatically from 1993-1996 in the
context of mass privatization, the fleeing of the labor force into the informal sector, and mass
unemployment caused by the bankruptcy of many large enterprises that had been the hallmark of
the planned economy. Consequently, trade unions (for example, the Confederation of
Independent Trade Unions) participated in the process to some degree, but they could not serve
as a meaningful player in the design of the reform program. The evidence shows that there were
no other groups capable of entering the policy dialogue as proposal actors.vi The key
stakeholders in the new scheme – the contributors (customers) - were not represented in the
policy dialogue at all. 
International Organizations 
The technical assistance provided by international multilateral agencies as such as WB, ADB,
IBRD, the Governments of Japan and the United States (through USAID) was an important
factor at all stages of the reform process, from design to monitoring and evaluation. The basic
framework for pension reform in Kazakhstan was derived from the World Bank’s policy ideas
even without direct technical assistance from the Bank at the early stages. While experts of the
WB joined the working group when the design of the reform was already in progress, both the
expertise and technical support of international organizations (WB and USAID) had already
strengthened the Government`s capacity to design and implement the reform. On the other hand,
the tendency for the government to cooperate closely only with international financial
institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank led to the domination of a
technocratic vision of the concept of the reform. This occurred despite the fact that other
organizations such as the International Labor Organization also possess considerable experience
and expertise in dealing with pension issues as an advocate of PAYG (Appendix 1). This
situation is not unique and can be considered a fragment of the global tendency for international
financial organizations to enlarge their role in the diffusion of policies internationally,
7encouraging specific types of policy changes (privatization) through financial and technical
assistance. 
2.2.2 Communicating  vs. Dialogue
As the available information shows there was no real policy dialogue at the first stage of
Kazakhstani pension reform. Dialogue requires at least three necessary conditions: i) interested
parties occupying distinct positions; ii) their willingness and ability to articulate and promote
their positions with a certain degree of proficiency (expert capacity); and iii) an institutional and
political framework for the dialogue. In the case of the pension reform, none of the
aforementioned circumstances was fully present. 
In reality, at the initial stage of the reform process, only two actors fulfill their role on the
pension policy scene: the government (as a policy designer and decision-making center) and
international aid agencies (as a source of technical support and policy ideas for the decision-
making). Both meet the requirements to execute their role as actors in the policy dialogue
effectively  – they possess the interest, ability, and proficiency in designing and promoting
reform proposals. Other actors – Parliament, political parties, trade unions, and civil society
groups – did not demonstrate sufficient proficiency to participate equally in the dialogue as in the
process of interactive multilateral communication. 
Thus, in a situation where it was no a need to develop a multiparty dialogue, the latter was
replaced by the attempts to communicate the reform through public information/education
campaigns. The designers of the reform understood that the success of the program depended
“not only on the creation of its components – laws and regulations; administrative and regulatory
bodies; market actors, such as private pension funds and assets managers; administrative and
regulatory procedures; and infrastructure (computer networks, databases, and so forth) – but also
on ability of the Government to explain and justify the reform to a public that had lived most of
its life under a system of central economic planning” (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091, September 2003,
v). 
There is a range of assessments of how and what the Government has done in communicating the
pension reform project. The fact is that with the assistance of ADB, WB, USAID, and IBRD,
which together provided about USD 2 million for public information and media campaign
(according to the reports of WB and ADB) the Government realized a program that included
surveys, public information trough TV and leaflets, seminars for the press, trade unions,
employer organizations, and government officials throughout the country. In addition some
foreign non-governmental organizations were involved in the campaign to a certain degree. For
8instance, in 2000-2001 CARANA Corporation (USA) received a grant from WB for the
implementation of a pension reform public education program with a focus on the promotion of
private pension funds. The CARANA`s program included a media information campaign, with
special emphasis on the self-employed and rural sectors. Its communications strategy was
focused on increasing participation by building public confidence, based on a better
understanding of how the pension system works and how individual contributors could best
manage their own participation. CARANA also trained journalists and local officials to ensure
ongoing public education after project completion.vii (CARANA`s report on this program is not
available). 
However, there is no information, which shows that the local civil society actors were somehow
involved in the design, implementation or monitoring of public education campaigns, conducted
by the government and foreign organizations. Also there is no any available data on the
assessment of the effectiveness of those public information campaigns, conducted either by
government or foreign organizations, except a short comment in the ADB`s report saying: As the
public’s awareness and understanding of the new pension system has grown, in response to
public information activities and direct marketing by the private pension funds, participation in
these funds has increased from less than 20% in 1998 to almost 75% in 2003. Two surveys, one
conducted at the beginning and one conducted at the conclusion of TA 3082-KAZ: Public
Information and Education in Support of Pension Reform, indicated that public awareness and
understanding of the pension system had increased. The degree to which this increase is
attributable to TA 3082-KAZ is hard to assess, but it clearly played a significant role. (ADB,
PPA: KAZ 31091, September 2003, 13).
2.2.3 Current status of the reform and policy dialogue
Kazakhstan’s pension reform was, at the time, the largest and the most radical attempted in any
post-Communist country (ADB, WB). The reform was complex in design and challenging to
implement when juxtaposed against nascent capital markets, the weakness of institutional
infrastructure and lack of governance background. The scope of the reform conducted in
Kazakhstan is impressive. Its implementation necessitated the development of new laws and
promulgating regulations and entirely new institutions.  The administration of the new system
required the issuance of social identification codes to millions people, as well as
computerization, and the development of a new administrative system (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091,
September 2003, iv-v). 
9In Table 1, there is a list of some standard measures proposed in the literature on pension reform.
From this table we see that the range of measures, that to some degree were implemented in
Kazakhstan during seven years of the reform (marked bold), does not include such issues as
equity of pension levels, new role for the public pillar, rules (and markets) for annuities and
withdrawal of funds. The main focus of the reform was on the development of capital markets,
infrastructure, and institutions, rather than the enlargement of social protection: The reformers
were focused on input aspects of the system, rather the output ones, as nobody answered yet the
questions - How and how much will contributors receive when they retire, and what will happen
with those people who are not enrolled to the funded system and with those, who will not have a
significant amount of pension assets?
Table1. Selected Reform Measures
I. Restructuring the Public PAYG System
1. Raise the retirement age 
2. Eliminate preferential treatment for specific occupations
3. Tighten disability and early retirement requirement
5. Lower targeted replacement rate to more realistic levels
6. Reduce inequality of pension levels
7. Fight evasion
8. Improve administrative capacity
II. Establish A Fully Funded (FF) System 
A. Establish a System of Individual Accounts
1. Establish the role for public pillar (flat-rate, means-tested, etc.?)
2. Create mandatory or voluntary accounts
3. Set contribution rates
4. Institute life and disability insurance
5. Establish rules (and markets) for annuities and withdrawal of funds
B. Establish a Regulatory Framework
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1. Create or reorganize regulatory agencies (new or existing agency)
2. Establish competent supervision and regulation powers
3. Establish entry/exit requirements for pension funds
4. Solvency rules
5. Investment rules
6. Establish reporting and disclosure rules
7. Establish state guarantees (protection against insolvency)
C. Transition Plan and Actuarial Model to Estimate Costs
1. Compensation for vested pension rights (recognition bonds, other compensation)
2. Periodic review of regulations for insurance plans, pensions, training for staff
3. Train regulators, fund managers, actuaries, accountants, and auditors
4. Public relations campaign
Source: adapted from Kay, S., 2001 
According to the official statistic data by January 2004, new pension scheme covered 6 million
people, representing approximately 80 percent of the economically active population. However,
according to other sources less than 50 percent of contributors make payments on a regular basis
and in the full amount. The managers of NSAF report, that a large number of contributors have
more than one pension account. It means that the number of pension accounts announced in the
official reports does not reflect a real number of people enrolled in the new pension system. At
the same time, the other part of the population - self-employed workers in the informal sector
or/and unemployed people – are still in the socio-economic shadows. Theoretically, at least some
of them should benefit from the Pillar 3 - a voluntary system. But in practice, less than 0.5% of
personal pension accounts (27 000) were opened at pension funds on a voluntary basis by
January 2004 (Report of the National Bank of RK). 
The World Bank`s preliminary actuarial calculations, made in 2003, show that in 40 years more
than 35 percent of the retirement age population is expected to have no significant benefit from
the funded system (Kazakhstan Pension Policy Note – Concept Note, 2003, 2). Furthermore,
there is still no a scheme promising to those segments of population who not covered by FPS a
possibility to have any benefits in their retirement period. Not surprisingly, 100 percent of high-
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positioned managers of pension funds (according to the results of an expert poll conducted by
the Kazakhstani Association of Pension Funds Contributors in February 2004) assess the level
of population`s reliance to pension funds and to the new pension system as “close to low”. The
same 100 percent asses the level of population`s awareness on funded pension system as “the
population is not informed enough”.
A survey conducted in Almaty (the biggest city in Kazakhstan) in November 2003 of a randomly
drawn sample of the working populationviii illustrates an astonishingly low level of workers`
awareness about the features of the new pension system. 92 percent of the sample do not know or
do not know enough to manage their pension assets. No one monitors the activity of his/her
(S/N)AF on regular basis, more then 40 percent do not know to which (S/N)AF they make their
transfers. 80 percent of the sample think that their pension assets will not allow them to have
adequate benefits in retirement period. 24 of 25 respondents do not know or have difficulties in
answering how much and in what way they will receive benefits from their pension accounts. 36
percent do not trust the new system, 56 percent have not made a decision yet whether to trust it
or not, although 56 percent say that they worry about their income in old age very often. 
The arrears in transfers to pension accounts have become quite a sensitive problem both for
contributors as well as for (N)SAFs. An array of employers do not follow the compulsory regime
of transfers of employees` contributions to pension accounts. According to the Ministry of
Finance, by 1 October, 2003, the total employers` debt of mandatory pension transfers is about
USD 131 million (KZT 19.3 billionix). According to the poll conducted by COMCON agency
that covered 1000 respondents around the country (3/4 of the sample are (S)AF contributors) 68
per cent of the sample say that they did not choose their (S)AF - employers made the choice; 11
percent have difficulties answering this question, and only 21 per cent of the sample say that they
chose their (S)AF by themselvesx, what in many cases implies a direct violation of the Pension
Law and other regulations. 
Thus, today it becomes obvious that a range of inadequacies and adjustments to the pension
system would require a second phase of reform. The government stands against the need to
conduct assessment of the first stage of the reform and development a conceptual framework for
further strategies. However, even after seven years of the reform Kazakhstani government calls
for external experts to provide necessitate analyses. In 2003, expert groups of WB and ADB
launched the series of analyses which cover the entire range of problems in the new pension
system: governance of the system, benefit adequacy, coverage, and distributional concerns,
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absorption capacity of the capital markets, etc. (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091, September 2003; WB,
Kazakhstan Pension Policy Note – Concept Note, 2003). 
In interviews, executives and local researchers mentioned that the assistance of multilateral
agencies was very helpful during the initial stages of the reform, but eventually it became clear
that outside expertise can be used just to a certain degree and cannot not replace domestic
capacity. Nevertheless, most of the recent reports on pension reform are still prepared by foreign
experts, even though they are based and put together from the data gathered by governmental
agencies (MSLP, NBK, and MOF). This fact clearly demonstrates that Kazakhstani government
yet does not have a sufficient in-house research and expert capacity to sustain the reform without
an outside support. Also, we see that the other domestic actors – civil society organizations,
political parties, stakeholders, and researchers - are not involved in this discourse even at the
second stage of the reform. Furthermore, as it seen their capacity to participate in the dialogue on
the perspectives of pension reform has not evolved during past seven years. There is still no a
research or civic group that could be capable to enter the policy dialogue with a significant
amount of proficiency. 
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2.3 Key Lessons Learned
I. Imbalance in the achievement of the reform`s goals. 
The reform program has two strategic goals: (i) a sustained economic recovery, capital markets
development, increasing private savings, and (ii) assured acceptable old-age income security for
(current and) future pensioners. Taking into account the context in which the program was
designed and introduced (time pressure, nascent capital markets and infrastructure, inadequacy
of knowledge and cultural background) the accomplishment of the first goal is impressive. The
new system generated a significant volume of new institutions and regulations that did not exist
until the reform. Pension fund assets (7.5 % of GDP by the year 2003) were invested in an
increasingly diversified portfolio, and managed by a developing pension fund industry (WB,
Kazakhstan Pension Policy Note – Concept Note, 2003). However, preliminary analyses reveal
that currently pension scheme does not meet the second, critical goal – provision of sufficient
pension income for retirees. In 40 years, more than 35 percent of the retirement age population is
expected to have no significant benefit from the funded system (WB, Kazakhstan Pension Policy
Note – Concept Note, 2003, 2). Thus, it obvious, that a range of inadequacies in the pension
system points to the need for a second phase of reform. The new Kazakhstani pension system is
designed and implemented mostly from the side of input: regulations, infrastructure, training of
government agencies staff and market operators. Whereas, it is leaving aside the output (social)
functions - benefit adequacy, coverage, and equity – remain undeveloped. The keystone
questions for any pension system are not answered in Kazakhstan yet – i) How and how much
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will contributors receive when they retire? ii) How the part of population that is not enrolled (and
probably will not be enrolled in the years ahead) in the funded scheme will be provided with
sufficient income upon reaching retirement age? 
II.  Imbalance in the shape of policy outcomes might be rooted in the characteristics of the policy
process. 
The Government, as well as the expert groups associated with the international multilateral
agencies (the World Bank and Asian Development Bank), turn out to be more concerned with
the long-term economic – although not necessarily political -- sustainability of reforms. A series
of analyses and assessments have been launched in order to develop a conceptual framework for
the next stage of reform. Although the evidence shows that typically most analyses of pension
reforms conducted by local or international experts in any part of the world concentrate on the
technical aspects of the reform, leaving the decision-making aspects to others. The political and
decision-making aspects of the reform are nevertheless key factors affecting the implementation
of the reforms and the long-term viability of the reform agenda. From this perspective, the policy
is a “product” of the process by which it was designed and elaborated, and the policy output’s
characteristics are directly related to the nature of the process that produced them. 
In the Kazakhstani case, some of the systematic shortcomings in the nature of the pension reform
are rooted in the qualities of the process of design and deliberation. Tracing this process stage by
stage and actor by actor, it can be noticed that the shape of the reform concept has been
influenced by i) the composition of policy actors participating in the process and their ability to
serve as proposal actors. 
? Domination of financial sub-groups in the design process against a backdrop of a shortage of
participation by proposal actors interested in advocating for social protection had coursed the
supremacy of macroeconomic priorities and inferiority of social protection targets of the reform
(App. 1).  
? The governmental working group led by the finance sub-group was the only actor that was
able to execute an active role in the reform program’s development and implementation. The
other actors such as parliament, political parties, trade unions, interests groups, and SCOs did not
demonstrate enough proficiency to participate equally in the policy dialogue. (The term
proficiency includes the ability of potential policy actors i) to elaborate policy alternatives, and
ii) to exert sufficient volume of pressure to push their policy ideas onto political agenda).
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? In the case of Kazakhstani pension reform the evidence shows, that despite the rhetoric about
the importance of good governance principles, international multilateral agencies did not pay
enough attention to the openness and inclusiveness of the decision-making process. By providing
technical assistance just to the governmental working group, international agencies gave it
unparallelled advantage and aggravated existed imbalances in the capacity of policy actors to
participate in the policy dialogue. 
III. In complex policy areas (such as the case of pension reform), expertise capacity of policy
actors is a key factor of their adequate participation in the policy process. 
In the milieu of increasing complexity of socio-economical and political contexts, the role of
knowledge needed for the development and implementation of policies escalates dramatically.
Reasonably, knowledge becomes a vital factor affecting the ability of policy actors to influence
the political agenda and the shape of policy outcomes. The case of Kazakhstani pension reform
substantiates this.  The lack of expert capacity (reliable knowledge) among partisan and
institutional veto actors and interests groups evidently diminished their ability to participate in
the policy dialogue. 
At the same time, in a society suffering from a scarcity of knowledge (as in the Kazakhstani
case), multilateral agencies that possessed expert knowledge tend to dominate in the policy
dialogues. Furthermore, international organizations in this case act more like “the holders of the
keys to knowledge” rather than organizations interested in local ownership and long-term
sustainability of the reforms that they assist. Local ownership of reforms implies the ability of a
society with its own resources to sustain policies during the repeated cycles of policy
development, implementation, monitoring, and adjustment.  However in the Kazakhstani case
the evidence shows that (i) the domestic policy actors are not able to sustain the reform without
using an external expertise, and (ii) international financial institutions do not foster local policy
actors to raise their ability to sustain the reform without external support.   
IV. Reform is an ongoing project that requires enduring consultations with and participation of
all interested parties.
Like the reform experience in other parts of the world, the case of Kazakhstani pension reform
will require ongoing steering and refinement.  Several aspects of the situation are noteworthy.
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? “…Social security reform is itself an ongoing project. Rather than being a one-time event,
the process of reform ... is a multi-staged, politically-driven process”. (Kay, Stephen, 2001, 4). 
? “Pension reform and other social sector reforms are more complicated politically than “first
generation” structural adjustment reforms. …Whereas structural adjustment reforms could be
designed by insulated technicians, implemented through executive decree, and rarely target
particular groups, social sector reforms directly affect the interests and eventually require the
active participation of consumers and producers as well as approval by elected legislation”
(James, E. & Brooks, S., 2001, 14).
? The design of the Kazakhstani pension reform was based on the experience gained in other
parts of the world (particularly in Latin America). The radical change from PAYG to a fully
funded system means “loosening the social contract” of the citizen`s dependence on the state
system. It requires mature and well-informed citizens to make the switch to individual
responsibility to save for retirement rather than spend now. Thus, the education and informing of
current and potential contributors the system becomes a key social and economic concern.
(Presentation: Pension Fund Reform and Implications for the Market, SSB Citi Asset
Management Ltd, 2001).xi Ricardo Zabala (Global Retirement Services, Citigroup), assessing the
experience of pension reforms in Latin America, notes: “These reforms are very appealing: high
asset accumulation, impact on the capital market, etc. However, the essence is invisible to the
eyes. 
The real reform is a shift: 
? to the ownership of each individual account’s own assets
? to a decentralized, competitive system  
It moves “power to people”. The individuals choose:
? Who manages their funds
? When to pension themselves
? What type of pension scheme.”xii 
However, the first phase of the reform was focused on the economic and technical parameters of
the pension system, whereas the social and political dimensions of the reform process were left
out of the discussion. An astonishingly low level of awareness and a high level of distrust in the
population make it evident that communicating the advantages of the reforms and endorsing
multiparty policy dialogue are essential to their long-term viability. This dialogue has to include
contributors and market operators in order to promote broader coverage, consumers`
participation, and the population`s trust in the new system.
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III. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
In a milieu of increasing complexity, especially in the socio-economic and political contexts,
knowledge becomes a vital factor affecting the ability of policy actors to influence the political
agenda and the shape of policy outcomes. Like in many other transition countries the
Kazakhstani pension reform was based on externally-imported knowledge which was supplied
by international financial institutions. Factually, international organizations like WB and ADB
served as a main resource of knowledge for the pension reform in Kazakshtan. They shared their
knowledge with the Kazakhstani government providing an extensive technical and financial
assistance. Thus, indigenous knowledge in this area was concentrated solely within the
government agencies during the years of reform. However, even after seven years of the reform,
government agencies are not able to further the reform without the use of external expertise. 
At the same time, there were not built any democratic institutions or mechanisms, which could
include basic democratic features like citizen debate and political parties that propose a variety
of policy alternatives. Due to a severe scarcity of expert capacity (reliable knowledge) partisan
and institutional veto actors and civil society groups were limited in their ability to participate in
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the policy dialogue in a meaningful and influential way. The situation remains the same today.
The government is launching the second phase of the reform, however there is no any partisan or
institutional veto actors that posses the level of expertise that allows them to be included in this
process effectively at the next stage of the reform. 
The lack of involvement of domestic actors in the formulation of policy alternatives and the
prominent role of international actors means that the public may perceive the policy as an
external product imposed by outsiders.  Furthermore, without the active participation of those
most directly affected by the reform (i.e., pensioners and future pensioners), experts may fail to
incorporate critical contextual features that are important to the reform's success, both politically
and technically.  
Finally, the reform was not communicated by the government in a way and degree that could
raise population`s reliance to the reform and enrollment in the new pension system. Even today,
after seven years of reform, there is a lack of information on the new pension system available
for the population. Not surprisingly, the population responses to this vacuum of information with
turnover and an astonishingly low level of trust to the reform.
Policy Recommendations 
Taking into consideration the lessons learned from the first stage of the pension reform the
following policy recommendations for the next phase of the reform are proposed:
(i) Develop and maintain credible technical data, meaning data that is both reliable and
accepted by the various actors, concerning the financial state of pension systems and prospects
for the future. These data are the basis for discussion and debate, and can lead to informed
political choices from among the available options. The formulas for sources and producers of
these data might vary, but the important point is that the data concerned are available and that
their credibility is beyond question. For instance, in the United Kingdom, an independent
institution within the government structure (the Government Actuary) collects and analyzes such
data. In the United States, the Social Security Administration (the governing body of which
includes representatives of the opposition party) is responsible for financial monitoring; in
Germany, the figures are produced by institutions whose reputation guarantees their validity
(Federation of Pension Insurance Institutions, Federal Office of statistics, Federal Bank).
(Adapted from ILO recommendations, Geneva, 2000). 
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(ii) Build domestic expert (research and analytical) capacity relating to pension policy through
the improvement of in-house research capacity of the responsible governmental agencies (MOF
and MLSP); support of research projects conducted by local research groups and research
institutes; expand  the expert capacity of the Parliament and political parties;  
(iii) In collaboration with CSOs, elaborate and conduct a complex communication/public
education strategy aimed to improve enrollment, awareness of the funded system and access of
the population to information relating to pensions on permanent basis (through media, ICT, and
public education campaigns).
(iv) Expand the participation of contributors in the reform development through the support of
CSOs working with workers and pension funds contributors.
(v) Establish advisory bodies or working groups to participate, permanently or on an ad hoc
basis, in the decision-making process relating to pensions. These advisory councils should be an
integral part of the process of monitoring and periodic review of the system. They might include
representatives of employers' organizations and trade unions, academics and qualified experts. In
a complex and highly technical area such as pensions, these councils are forums for examining
the system and propose compromises to assist decision-making by legislators. These bodies also
might underpin the formation of a consensus on a topic of potential conflict. (Adapted from ILO
recommendations, Geneva, 2000).
(vi) Develop the quality of expertise through the establishment of a forum for researchers and
experts in the area of pensions (workshops, conferences, web resources, publications, etc.), add
to the curricular courses on economic and societal implications of pension reforms, maintain
links between practitioners (executives of pension funds, National Bank, MOF, MSLP) and
universities and research centers.
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Endnotes
                                                
i As Smith, J. (The Idea Brokers-Think Tanks and Rise of Policy Elite, 1993) notes there are a lot of terms that mark various
types of organizations that participate in the policy process, engineer policies or policy choices: brain banks, think factories, egg-
head row, etc. The term “think tank” is “now-familiar” and wide-spread throughout the international policy community at
present.
ii For instance, the State Academy of Science working in different areas from social science to medicine and engineering, as
many others Soviet organizations had its head- quarter in Moscow and divisions in every republic of the Union.
iii The external state debt is gradually decreasing.  For the last three years (from July 1, 1999 through July 1, 2002) the average
number of annual growth of GNP came to 11%.  Mr. Marchenko, Head of National Bank, stated that Kazakhstan with its
economic growth is one of the three most rapidly developing countries in the world.
iv Source: The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan
v The original Agreement was on 300 million loan, but the Government refused the 3-d 100 million disbursement
vi Even some groups loosing their privileges and special retirement benefits (air controllers, pilots, and steelworkers) organized
protests in July 1997. (Orenstein, 2000, 30)
vii http://www.carana.com/services/pages/kaz_pension.htm
viii The survey was conducted in November 2003 in Almaty. The sample is randomly formed. It includes male / female at age 20-
45 respondents working in formal sector in private companies of different scale (resident and non-resident), non-profits and
government agencies.
ix This amount includes penalties
x http://www.comcon-2.kz/publication/publ_000019.php
xi http://www.pensionline.ru/_data/SSBCiti/page_01.htm
xii http://www.pensionline.ru/_data/citibank/page_15.htm
